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NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAv
CiHARLES B. ROBISON, Case Editor
EVIDENCE-SEARCH AND SEIZURE
WIHOUT WAR'AxT.-[South Da-
kota] Defendant was legally ar-
rested just outside his room. The
arresting officer returned half an
hour later and searched defendant's
room without a warrant. On the
evidence thus secured defendant
was tried and convicted of the
crime of having burglary tools in
his possession. On appeal, re-
versed. Held: The evidence was
illegally obtained and therefore in-
admissible. State v. McClendon,
266 N. W. 762 (S. D. 1:936).
While it has always been as-
sumed that "one's house cannot
lawfully be searched without a
search warrant except as incident
to a lawful arrest therein" (Ag-
nello v. United States, 296 U. S. 20
(1935)), was the search in the
present case incident to the arrest?
In Papani v. United States, 84 F.
(2d) 160 (C. C. A. 9th, 1936), it
was said that a search is not in-
cidental to the arrest unless made
contemporaneously at the place of
arrest. This seems to be the preva-
lent federal view with which the
instant case is in accord. Other
federal cases simply assume, with-
out discussing the time element,
that search and seizure of evidence
is not only permissible but also the
duty of an officer when serving an
arrest warrant. United States v.
Mills, 185 Fed. 318 (S. D. N. Y.
1910); United States v. Wilson, 163
Fed. 338 (S. D. N. Y. 1908);
United States v. Snyder, 278 Fed.
650 (D. C. W. Va. 1922); Rocchia
v. United States, 78 F. (2d) 966 (C.
C. A. 9th, 1935); Bruce v. United
States, 73 F. (2d) 972 (C. C. A.
8th, 1935). The circumstances of
the instant case are almost identi-
cal with those of People v. Defore,
242 N. Y. 13, 150 N. E. 585 (1926),
and Poulos v. United States, 8 F.
(2d) 120 (C. C. A. 6th, 1925). In
the former case the search was
made some time after an illegal ar-
rest. The New York Court of Ap-
peals inferred that if the arrest had
been legal the search also would
have been legal. In the Poulos
case the several .srclies subse-
quent to the arrest were held un-
reasonable. The fact that they
might have been incident to the
arrest was not discussed. The con-
stitution prohibits only unreason-
able searches and seizures, and the
fact that the search is not precisely
contemporaneous with the arrest
should not necessarily make it un-
reasonable. See generally, Fraen-
kel, Concerring Search and Seiz-
ures (1921) 34 Harv. L. Rev. 361;
Comment (1926) 35 Yale L. J. 612.
The issue in the instant case should
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be the reasonableness of the time
interval between the arrest and the
search.
Once a court has determined that
the evidence has been obtained il-
legally, it is further confronted
with the issue of the admissibility
of such evidence. The common law
rule, which thirty-three states fol-
low, is that the "admissibility of
evidence is not affected by the il-
legality of the means through
which the party has been enabled
to obtain the evidence. The il-
legality is by no means condoned;
it is merely ignored." 4 WIGMORE,
EV-DENCE (2d ed. 1923) §2183. There
are two exceptions: matters of of-
ficial record, and self incriminating
documents or other evidence the
use of which in criminal cases
would violate the Fifth Amend-
ment. See WIGMORE, loc cit. supra.
The court in the instant case ad-
heres to the professed federal rule
that evidence obtained by illegal
search and seizure cannot be used
as evidence on trial. In Weeks v.
United States, 232 U. S. 383 (1914),
the Supreme Court held that evi-
dence obtained by illegal search
and seizure is inadmissible. Ac-
cord: Silverthorne Lumber Co. v.
United States, 251 U. S. 385 (1920).
See Note (1931') 22 J. Crim. L. 589.
Prior to the Weeks case the Court
had held that evidence which is
pertinent to the issue is admissible
although it may have been pro-
cured illegally. Adams v. New
York, 192 U. S. 585 (1904). But
since the later case, evidence has
been held inadmissible where the
search is made as an incident to an
illegal arrest (Lefkowitz v. United
States, 285 U. S. 452 (1931) noted
(1932) 23 J. Crim. L. 111; Byars v.
United States, 273 U. S. 28 (1927)),
or is purely exploratory (Go-Bart
v. United States, 282 U. S. 344
(1931); Ganci v. United States, 255
U. S. 313 (1921)), or is for goods
lawfully in the possession of the
defendant (Amos v. United States,
255 U. S. 3!= (1921); Boyd v.
United States, 116 U. S. 616 (1886).
The Supreme Court has nar-
rowed the scope of the general rule,
expressed in the Weeks case, how-
ever, by holding evidence admis-
sible under the following circum-
stances: (1) where the objects are
in the immediate possession of the
defendant (Marron v. United
States, 275 U. S. 192 (1927)); (2)
where the issue of admissibility is
raised too late (Segurola v. United
States, 275 U. S. 107 (1927)); (3)
where there is no physical seizure
(Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.
S. 438 (1927)); (4) where the seiz-
use is not from the home or office
of the defendant (Carroll v. United
States, 267 U. S. 132 (1925)); (5)
where the search and seizure are
not conducted by federal officers
(Gambino v. United States, 275 U.
S. 310 (1927); Burdeau v. Mc-
Dowell, 256 U. S. 465 (1920)); and
(6) where the goods taken are con-
traband in any sense. (Carroll v.
United States; Fenton v. United
States, 268 Fed. 221 (D. C. Mont.
1920). Judge Hand, in summar-
izing the federal rule, makes this
distinction: "Private books and
papers cannot be seized and used
as incriminating evidence. The
corpus delicti itself has not, I think,
been held incapable of detention
and production to establish the
crime." United States v. Welsh, 247
Fed. 239 (S. D. N. Y. 1917). See
Comment (1927) 36 Yale L. J. 536,
where the status of the federal rule
is discussed. If this distinction is
sound, the burglary tools in the in-
stant case were the corpus delicti
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of the crime of possession and
should, therefore, have been ad-
mitted in evidence.
The South Dakota decisions ap-
pear to be in a state of confusion
on this point. In the following cases
objects which were the corpus
delicti of the crime and incidentally
also contraband were held admis-
sible: City of Sioux Falls v. Wal-
ser, 45 S. D. 417, 187 N. W. 821
(1922) (illegal liquor seized);
State v. Kieffer, 47 S. D. 180, 196
N. W. 967 (1924) (illegal liquor
seized); State v. Newharth, 59 S.
D. 272, 209 N. W. 542 (1926) (con-
tainers for illegal liquor seized).
But such cases are to be contrasted
with the following in which ille-
gally seized evidence was held in-
admissible: Gamble v. Keyes, 49
S. D. 39, 153 N. W. 888 (1925) (il-
legal liquor seized); State v. Tan-
ner, 53 S. D. :46, 235 N. W. 502
(1931); State v. Gooder, 57 S. D.
619, 234 N. W. 610 (1931) (illegal
liquor seized).
These cases permitting contra-
band illegally seized to be used in
evidence strike a balance between
the common law rule and that of
the Weeks case, supra. Since the
defendant has no property rights in
the contraband, the constitutional
provision against illegal searches
and seizures is not violated by its
use in evidence; and since the
goods are not obtained by the use
of process against him as a wit-
ness, he is not forced to give in-
criminating testimony against him-
self. Wigmore, Using Evidence
Obtained by Illegal Search and
Seizure (1922) 8. A. B. A. J. 479.
Lois GOLBSTEnu.
HABEAs Cc.OPus-DENIA. OF RiGHir
TO COU.NSEL.-[Federal] Peti-
tioners, who were indigent, unedu-
cated and without friends, were
indicted for possessing and utter-
ing counterfeit money. They were
not informed of the fact until
brought into court for trial. At
that time they pleaded not guilty
and the trial judge asked them if
they had counsel. When they re-
sponded in the negative, he did not
inquire whether they wished coun-
sel appointed, but proceeded with
the trial, which resulted in a con-
viction. Petitioners did not ask
for a new trial or inform the court
that they wished to appeal. After
they had spent several months in
prison they filed application for ap-
peal. When these were denied be-
cause filed too late, petitioners
sought writs of habeas corpus, al-
leging that their constitutional
right to counsel had been violated.
The petitions were denied. Held:
The rights of petitioners under both
the Fifth and Sixth Amendments
of the Constitution were violated,
but this could not be attacked on
habeas corpus proceedings. Brid-
well v. Aderhold, Warden, 13 F.
Supp. 253 (N. D. Ga. 1935).
The court agreed that the fail-
ure of the trial judge to appoint
counsel deprived petitioners of
their constitutional rights, but re-
fused to lend its aid on the ground
that since the court had jurisdic-
tion, mere errors of law could be
corrected only on appeal or writ
of error. The general rule fol-
lowed by the federal courts is that
habeas corpus can be used only to
attack the jurisdiction of the court.
Ex Parte Crouch, 112 U. S. 118
(1884); In re Schneider, 148 U. S.
162 (1893); Riddle v. Dyche, 262 U.
S. 333 (1923); Knewel v. Egan, 268
U. S. 442 (1925); see Dobie, Ha-
beas Corpus in the Federal Courts
(1927) 13 Va. L. Rev. 433, 435.
This rule is generally followed in
the state courts. People ex rel.
Morris v. Hazard, 356 Il. 448, 191
N. E. 54 (1934); People v. Harris,
266 Mich. 317, 253 N. W. 312 (1934).
(The distinction between those
facts which are mere error and
those which vitiate jurisdiction is
drawn by Williams, Federal Habeas
Corpus (1924) 9 St. Louis L. Rev.
250, 260.)
But the scope of review on ha-
beas corpus in the federal courts
is not always restricted to ques-
tions of jurisdiction alone. In
Henry v. Henkel, 235 U. S. 219
(1914), the Court stated that no
hard and fast rule had been for-
mulated as to how far it would go
in passing upon questions raised
on habeas corpus proceedings. This
statement, though dicta, clearly in-
dicates that the Supreme Court
recognizes that there may be cer-
tain instances in which it will look
beyond the question of jurisdiction.
In United States ex rel. Kennedy v.
Tyler, 269 U. S. 13 (1925), it was
said that the Court has power to
issue a writ of habeas corpus to
inquire into the cause of the de-
tention of any person asserting
that he is being held in violation
of the Constitution, laws or trea-
ties of the United States. The
power to make these determina-
tions surely constitutes an enlarge-
ment of the basic rule that only
jurisdictional matters may be con-
sidered. See note to Capone v.
Aderhold, Warden, 71 F. (2d) 160
(C. C. A. 5th, 1934), in (1935) 3
Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 253. In the
Capone case, however, the court
refused the writ where it appeared
the indictment was returned after
the three-year limitations had run.
(For a contrary result, see People
v. McGee. 1 Cal. "(2d) 611, 36 P.
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(2d) 378 (1934) noted (1935) 8 S.
Calif. L. Rev. 155.)
In Moore v. Dempscy, 261 U. S.
86 (1923), habeas corpus was
granted, not on the ground that the
trial court lacked jurisdiction, but
that the conviction in the Arkansas
court, dominated by mob violence,
was a denial of due process of law.
(For an interesting discussion of
the details of this case, see Water-
man and Overton, The Aftermath
of Moore v. Dempsey (1933) 18 St.
Louis L. Rev. 117, and Federal Ha-
beas Corpus and Moore v. D,2lnp-
sey (1933) 1 U. of Chi. L. Rev.
397.) Where the conviction is had
in a federal court the Supreme
Court would probably be more
willing to consider non-jurisdic-
tional questions than it would in
state cases. See Ashe v. United
States ex rel. Vals-tta, 270 U. S. 424,
426 (1926); Nutting, The Supreme
Court, the Fourteenth Amendment
and C riminal Cases (1936) 3 U. of
Chi. L. Rev. 244; !1crtes (1,33) 23
J. Crim. L. 841, (1935) 25 J. Crim.
L. 943.
It is clear that deprivation of the
right to counsel in the present case
was a violation of constitutional
rights. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.
S. 45 (1932) noted (1933) 23 J.
Crim. L. 841; FERRis, EXTRAORDI-
NARY LEGArL REMEDMS (1926) 124;
Comment (1933) 31 Mich. L. Rev.
245, 252. That being so, the writ
should be granted when the con-
stitutional right is violated. See
Comment (1935) 35 Col. L. Rev.
404, 411-12. Though the doctrine
of Moore v. Dempsey, supra, would
limit granting the writ to "excep-
tional circumstances" (Cf. Gotto v.
L.ane, 265 U. S. 393 (1924); Ex
Parte Lang, 85 U. S. 163 (1873)),
it is believed that the exigencies of
the instant case were such as would
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warrant the use of the writ of ha-
beas corpus to effect the release of
the petitioners.
CHARLES B. ROBISON.
VERDICT PROCURED BY FRAUD---
BASTARDY PRoCEEDINGS.-[Pennsyl-
vania] Defendant was tried and
convicted on a charge of fornica-
tion and bastardy. He obtained a
new trial, at which time the prose-
cutrix agreed to drop the charges
and a verdict of acquittal was en-
tered after defendant refused to
accept a nolle prosequi. Two years
later it was discovered his attor-
neys had coerced the prosecutrix
to consent to the verdict. On mo-
tion of the Commonwealth, the
trial court set aside the verdict.
On appeal, reversed. Held: Pro-
ceedings in fornication and bas-
tardy being criminal in nature, a
verdict of acquittal cannot be set
aside, even though obtained by
fraud. Commonwealth v. Kroekel,
183 Atl. 749 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1936).
There are three distinct views in
the United States as to .the nature
of proceedings in bastardy. Penn-
sylvania, with Georgia and Maxy-
land, follows the English holding-
that it is essentially criminal. No
doubt the basis for this rule is, as
indicated in the principal case, the
fact that bastardy proceedings de-
pend on the criminal adultery stat-
ute in those states. See for ex-
ample: PA. STAT. (Purdon, 1930)
tit. 18, §711. A few more have
held that while the origin depends
upon criminal statutes the purpose
is not punishment, but the support
of the child, and thus the offense is
deemed quasi-criminal or quasi-
civil. In this group are Alabama,
Delaware, Florida, Kansas, Michi-
gan, New York, South Dakota and
Wisconsin. See 2 WHARTON, CRaV-
605
iNAL LAW (12th ed. 1932) §2103.
The third group, representing a
majority of the states, treats bas-
tardy proceedings as civil in na-
ture. In such jurisdictions the ver-
dict may be reached upon no more
than a preponderance of the evi-
dence, instead of the usual "be-
yond a reasonable doubt" formula
(Vail v. State, 1 Penn. (Del.) 8,
39 Atl. 451 (1897); People v.
Christmau, 66 IMI. 162 (1872); State
v. Nichols, 29 Minn. 357, 13 N. W.
153 (1882); State v. Haslebacher,
1'25 Ore. 389, 266 Pac. 900 (1928));
the defendant may be forced to
testify against himself (State v.
McKay, 54 N. D. 801, 211 N. W. 435
(1926); State v. Stilivell, 45 S. D.
606, 189 N. W. 697 (1927) (a juris-
diction holding such proceedings to
be quasi-criminal)); a statute im-
posing additional liability for sup-
port is retroactive (State v. Davis.
178 Ark. 692, 11 S. W. (2d) 479
(1928)); a statute allowing a five-
sixths verdict in civil cases can be
invoked (State v. Cummins, 56 S.
D. 439, 229 N. W. 302 (1930)); the
prosecution may appeal (Morris v.
State, 115 Ind. 282 (1888)); and it
may also obtain change of venue,
or a new trial (Saint v. State, 68
Ind. 128 (1879)). Since the pur-
pose of bastardy proceedings is
support of the child, the mother
being the real party in interest
(Libby v. State, 42 Olda. 603, 142
Pac. 406 (1914)), and the process
includes many elements of civil
suits, the better view would be to
consider such proceedings civil in
nature.
But recognizing that Pennsyl-
vania has held that proceedings of
this kind are criminal, setting aside
a verdict of acquittal procured by
fraud should not be regarded as
subjecting the defendant to a sec-
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ond trial. This question is raised
by the plea of autrefois acquit,
which is but the application to
criminal law of the broader doc-
trine of res judicata, that any con-
troversy once adjudicated between
the parties shall not again be ques-
tioned. The innocence of the ac-
cused is the controverted point,
and in order to make a valid plea
of former acquittal, the defendant
must show a verdict on the merits.
People v. Fishman, 119 N. Y. S. 89
(1909); see 2 HALE, PLEAS OF THE
CROWN (1778) 246; Cf. Conwill v.
State, 124 Miss. 716, 86 So. 876
(1921'). If, however, he procures
his own acquittal or conviction, it
will not be a bar to subsequent
prosecutions, whether in the same
or another court. State v. Ketchum,
113 Ark. 68, 167 S. W. 73 (1914)
(discharged); DeBord v. People, 27
Colo. 377, 61 Pac. 599 (1900) (con-
viction); State v. Reed, 26 Conn.
202 (1857) (acquittal); State v.
Green, 16 Iowa 239 (1864) (ac-
quittal); People v. Cuatt, 126 N. Y.
S. 1114 (f910) (conviction); Hal-
bert v. State, 18 Okla. Cr. Rep. 378,
195 Pac. 504 (1921) (conviction);
Richardson v. State, 109 Tex. Cr.
Rep. 403, 5 S. W. (2d) 141 (1928).
In theory there may be a dis-
tinction between the above cases
of collusive prosecution, and the
instant case of bona fide prosecu-
tion coupled with a subsequent
fraud by the defendant. But
viewed as a practical problem of
criminal law administration, the
distinction becomes even more
tenuous. See McDermott v. Com-
monwealth, 30 Ky. 1227, 100 S. W.
830 (1907) (collusive dismissal of
charges not a bar to later prosecu-
tion); State v. Swepson, 79 N. C.
674 (1878) (fraudulent acquittal no
bar to new prosecution, and man-
damus to reopen former prosecu-
tion refused); cf. Schneider v.
State, 33 Ohio App. 125, 168 N. E.
568, 569 (1929); but see Shideler
v. State, 129 Ind. 523, 28 N. E. 537
(1891) (bribery of prosecuting at-
torney did not render verdict of
acquittal void, the state being a
party). Writers on the problem
agree that a verdict of acquittal
obtained by fraud of the accused
should be no bar to a subsequent
prosecution. 1 BIsHOP, CRin=£NAL
LAw (9th ed. 1923) §1009; 1 Cnrs-
TY, CRImrNAL LAW (1819) §657; 2
WHARTON, CIM,-INAL PROCEDURE
(10th ed. 19f8) §13S1; Comley,
Former Jeopardy (1926) 35 Yale
L. J. 674, 677. Since the fraudulent
verdict in the instant case was not
a trial on the merits, it should not
bar a subsequent prosecution.
It is interesting to note that de-
fendant's attorneys were disbarred
as a result of the discovery of their
conduct in the Kroekel case. See
In re Salus, 22 Pa. D. & Co. R. 573
(1935), aff'd, 321 Pa. 106, 184 Atl.
70 (1936); In re Goldberg, 22 Pa.
D. & Co. R. 582 (1935), afd, 321




TION.-[Illinois] The president of
a corporation was convicted as an
accessory of his corporation in vio-
lation of the Motor Fuel Tax Act.
The court fined him $2000 on each
of eighteen counts charging the
collection of taxes and the refusal
to account therefor to the De-
partment of Finance. A sentence
of one to five years in the peniten-
tiary was imposed on four counts
charging the principal with doing
business as a distributor without a
license. On appeal, reversed. Held:
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Defendant could not be sentenced
to prison under the statute requir-
ing accessories before the fact to
be considered as principals since
the corporate principal could not
be imprisoned. People v. Duncan,
2 N. E. (2d) 705 (Ill. 1936).
The sole ground of reversal in
this case was the decision of the
court that an accessory of a corpo-
ration violating the criminal law
cannot be imprisoned whenever his
principal could not be imprisoned.
The court apparently read the pro-
vision in the Illinois law to be
"shall be considered the same as
his principal" instead of "shall be
considered as principal," as it
reads.
Under the Illinois statute it has
been held that an accessory is pun-
ishable as a principal even though
the principal is not convicted and
is not amenable to justice as
where the principal has been found
insane or has been promised im-
munity. Conley v. People, 170 Ill.
587, 48 N. E. 911 (1897); see Peo-
ple v. Armstrong, 299 Ill. 349, 353,
132 N. E. 547, 549 (1921), People
v. Rees, 268 Ill. 585, 593, 109 N. E.
473, 476 (1915). Thus, the amena-
bility of the principal to punish-
ment should have no effect upon
the amenability of the accessory to
punishment, and the instant case
should not have been reversed up-
on the grounds stated.
Under the Illinois statute provid-
ing that accessories be considered
as principals, the courts have held
that to receive the punishment of
a principal, the defendant must
have been indicted as principal, not
as accessory. Baxter v. People, 8
Ill. 368 (1846), Usselton v. People,
]49 Ill. 612, 36 N. E. 952 (1894),
Fixmer v. People, 153 Ill. 123, 38
N. E. 667 (1894), People v. Van
Bever, 243 II. 136, 93 N. E. 725
(1911). Since the defendant in the
instant case was indicted as acces-
sory, the decision could have been
reversed on the ground that he
could not be punished as principal.
The reason for such a rule is not
apparent, since the punishment is
the same in all ordinary cases, and
the defendant is not really harmed
by the form of the indictment.
Both these objectionable limita-
tions would have been avoided had
the defendant been indicted as a
principal. This could easily have
been done, since where the act con-
stituting the offense was done by
the corporation under the direction
or permission of the officer, he is
a principal. United States v. Win-
slow, 195 Fed. 578 (D. C. Mass.
1912), City of Wyandotte v. Cor-
rigan, 35 Kan. 21f, 10 Pac. 99 -(1886),
People v. Cooper, 193 N. Y. S. 16
(1922), State v. Thomas, 123 Wash.
299, 212 Pac. 253 (1923).
Many courts in states having
statutes like that of Illinois pro-
viding that accessories before the
fact be considered as principals
hold that the defendant may be in-
dicted as accessory and still re-
ceive the punishment of a princi-
pal. People v. Rozelle, 78 Cal. 84,
20 Pac. 36 (1888), Geutling v. State,
198 Ind. 718, 153 N. E. 765 (1926),
Commonwealth v. Bain, 240 Ky.
749, 43 S. W. (2d) 8 (1931), State
v. Ross, 29 Mo. 32 (1859), People
v. Smith, 177 N. Y. S. 519 (1919).
Under all such statutes the acces-
sory may be prosecuted, tried, and
punished though the real principal
be neither prosecuted nor tried.
Lake v. State, 100 Fla. 373, 129 So.
827 (1930), Commonwealth v. Long,
246 Ky. 809, 56 S. W. (2d) 524
(f"933), People v. Smith, 271 Mich.
553, 260 N. W. 911 (1935), People
v. Beinter, 168 N. Y. S. 945 (1918),
Thomas v. State, 40 Okla. Cr. Rep.
204, 267 Pac. 1040 (1928).
Where, however, the statute says
that the accessory shall be deemed
an accomplice and equally criminal
as the principal offender, and shall
be punished in the same manner,
the defendant must be indicted as
accessory. Schwartz v. State, 185
Atl. 233 (Del. 1936). Under such
a provision the rule of the instant
case, if accepted, could not be
avoided.
Had the defendant in the instant
case been the manager for an in-
dividual or a partnership the rea-
son given for reversal would have
been inapplicable. And yet the
criminality of each act would be
identical, and there is no reason for




FACIE EVIDENCE OF FELONIOUS IN-
TENT IN UNLICENSED POSSESSION OF
WEAPON.--[California] Defendant
was convicted of second degree
murder. At the time of the crime
he was carrying a pistol without a
license. The court instructed the
jury, without comment, that the
possession of a concealable weapon
without a license "was prima facie
evidence of intent to commit a fel-
ony against the person." CAL.
GEN. LAws (Deering, 1931) Act
1970, §3. The defendant pleaded
self defense and submitted evi-
dence that apparently would have
satisfied the jury of his innocence
but for the statutory presumption.
On appeal, reversed. Held: The
statute violates due process. Peo-
ple v. Murguia, 57 P. (2d) 115 (Cal.
1936).
Seemingly approving the manner
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of giving the charge, and directing
its attention to the statute, the
court concluded that there existed
no rational evidentiary relation be-
tween "the mere absence of a li-
cense to carry a weapon" and "the
intent with which the holder of a
weapon used it," and for this rea-
son declared the statute unconsti-
tutional. Manley v. Georgia, 279
U. S. 1 (1929); State v. Grimmet,
33 Idaho 203, 193 Pac. 380 (1920);
see People v. Cannon, 139 N. Y. 32,
43, 34 N. E. 759, 763 (1893); Mobile
v. Turnipseed, 219 U. S. 35, 43
(1910). The dissenting opinion ap-
proved the applicability of the test
used by the majority, but stated
that the inference was not unrea-
sonable nor "a purely arbitrary
mandate."
There is authority for the prop-
osition that the judiciary may not
inquire into the validity of a prima
facie inference established by stat-
ute. 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (2d ed.
1923) §1356. This view, however,
presupposes the court's use of the
term prima facie in its ordinary
meaning, i. e., that the presumption
is rebuttable by introduction of
evidence by the defendant. 5 WIG-
MORE, op. cit. supra §2487. Where,
however, the statute creates an ar-
bitrary presumption that is given
the effect of evidence and is to
prevail unless the opposing testi-
mony is found by the jury to pre-
ponderate, due process of law is
violated when there is no rational
connection between the fact and
the inference. Western & Atlantic
R. R. v. Henderson, 279 U. S. 639
(1929); Manley v. Georgia, supra;
Morrison v. California, 281 U. S. 82
(1934); cf. Casey v. United States,
276 U. S. 394, 425 (1928); see Note
(1929) 43 Harv. L. Rev. 100. Such
was the effect of the presumption
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in this case, and the test of rational
relation was proper. But one re-
cent decision has gone so far as to
hold that a criminal statute is un-
constitutional if the fact upon
which the inference rests would be
of itself insufficient to support a
conviction. Powers v. State, 204
lnd. 472, 184 N. E. 549 (1933) noted
(1934) 10 Ind. L. Rev. 180. This
extreme view, which seems to set
at naught the entire theory of pre-
sumptions, is not noticed in the
present opinion.
By its very broadness this statute
may facilitate, or even produce,
convictions of the most unfortunate
nature, for it creates in any gun
carrying, unlicensed defendant a
prina facie intent to commit any
"felony against the person" with
which he is charged by the prose-
cuting officer. By this undiscrim-
inatory creation of inference per-
sons unable to adduce evidence of
lack of intent might be convicted
of a felony upon mere proof of
simple assault-if charged with as-
sault with intent to commit felony
-or of felonious attempt upon
mere proof of a threatening act.
Moreover, conviction caused by
passion or prejudice of the jury,
otherwise resting solely upon the
presumption, could not be inquired
into. In the absence of precedents,
the court has as a matter of rea-
son, supported as well by con-
siderations of justice and the back-
ground of the statute, made a
proper determination that the stat-
ute is unconstitutional for the lack
of reasonable connection between
the fact of carrying a concealed
weapon unlicensed, and the inten',
to commit a felony.
This case is particulhrly interest-
ing in that it is one of the first to
consider the validity of a statute
which, as a part of uniform legis-
lation, has been enacted in eight
states. Rigorous firearm regula-
tion began in the United States in
1887 by the passage of a "license
to purchase" act in New York,
which was made more strhigent in
1911 by the famous "Sullivan Law,"
by which purchase or possession
of a concealable firearm became a
misdemeanor, and the carrying of
such a weapon without a license,
a felony. Laws of New York (1'911)
c. 195, §442. Little or no regulation
of firearms prevailed in other jur-
isdictions, and the periodical lit-
erature after the turn of the cen-
tury was rich in an outcry for more
effective control of firearms. See
[19091 Miss. B. A. Rep. 10; Garner,
Is the Pistol Responsible for Crime?
(1912) 1 J. Crim. L. 793; (1913)
16 Law Notes 207; (1'917) -84
Cent. L. J. 182; Prohibition of
Manufacture and Sale of Weapons
(1922) 8 A. B. A. J. 1'27. Soon
thereafter laws of many types were
passed to deal with the problem,
but no state enacted as stringent
a law as New York, partly because
of the concerted resistance of those
who wanted easy accessibility of
firearms for legitimate purposes.
Frederic, Pistol Regulation: Its
Principles and History (1932) 23
J. Crim. L. 531. Constitutional re-
strictions themselves presented
little or no obstacle to the regula-
tion of firearms. Emery, The Con-
etitutional Right to Keep and Bear
Arns (1915) 28 Harv. L. Rev. 473.
Following the World War those
who formerly resisted firearm reg-
ulation suggested uniform state
legislation drafted under the aus-
pices of the United States Revol-
ver Association. This draft was
enacted in California in 1923 and
also in Indiana, New Jersey, North
Dakota and Oregon, failing in Illi-
nois, but adopted in the District of
Columbia only after Section 3 (the
one in controversy in the present
case) was stricken out. The Uni-
form Firearms Act, approved in
1926, withdrawn, reconsidered and
approved again in 1930 (now
adopted in Pennsylvania, Rhode Is-
land and South Dakota), was mod-
elled upon this draft and contains
substantially all its provisions.
HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL COM-
MISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWVS
(1924) 224, 316, 854; (1927) 866,
914; (1930) 124, 530; Imlay, Uni-
form Firearms Act Reaffirmed
(1930) 16 A. B. A. J. 799. Beyond
the licensing of dealers, of whom
extensive records are required, and
the prohibition of sale to certain
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defective persons, felons, drug ad-
dicts and minors, nothing in the Act
prohibits the acquiring of a con-
cealable weapon by any citizen.
Control of evil use is sought by
means of heavy penalties for un-
licensed carrying, by wide increase
of punishment for being armed
while committing a felony, and,
through Section 3 by technical
facilitation of conviction for fel-
ony, of those who carry pistols
without a license. Because of the
obvious impossibility of wide pub-
lication, or understanding of this
highly techincal legality among
those who carry their weapons but
neglect to obtain a license, this
statute is but a negligible deterrent
to their criminal use.
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